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CHARM OFFENSIVE IN LILLIPUT: MILITARY COMMISSIONS 3.1 
EUGENE R. FIDELL* 
INTRODUCTION 
It’s a season of anniversaries. It has been over ten years since the execution 
of the November 13, 2001, Military Order by which President George W. Bush 
revived military commissions.1  Since their revival, the commissions have 
spawned a Niagara of scholarly analysis2 and, of course, litigation3—both out 
of all proportion to the handful of cases they have actually tried.  Both bodies 
of work, the scholarship and the litigation, have understandably focused on the 
 
* Senior Research Scholar in Law and Florence Rogatz Visiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law 
School.  This Article was presented as part of the 2011 Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture at 
Saint Louis University School of Law.  Portions are adapted from my remarks on “Limitations of 
the Military Commission Structure” at the American Constitution Society’s 2010 National 
Convention, Washington, D.C., June 19, 2010.  My reference to the current iteration of military 
commissions as “Military Commissions 3.1” is suggested by earlier authors’ references to 
Military Commissions 3.0.  See, e.g., Jonathan Tracy, Military Commissions 3.0 is the Wrong 
Answer, JURIST (May 29, 2009), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/ 2009/02/for-non-partisan-
commission-on-detainee.php; Dominika Švarc, Military Commissions 3.0, L., WAR & ST. AM. 
EXCEPTION (Oct. 30, 2009), http://lawwarandthestateoftheamericanexception.wordpress.com/ 
2009/10/30/military-commissions-3-0-2/; Nusrat Jahan Choudhury, Changing the Charges. 
Changing the Game, DAILY KOS (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/12/03/ 
810507/-Changing-the-Charges-Changing-the-Game.  I am grateful to Dennis E. Curtis, Joshua 
A. Geltzer, Carol Greenhouse, Linda Greenhouse, Judith Resnik, Dwight H. Sullivan, and P. 
Sabin Willett for their comments on a draft. 
 1. See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism § 4(a), 3 C.F.R. § 918, 918 (2001), reprinted in 10 
U.S.C. § 801 (2006) (“Any individual subject to this order shall, when tried, be tried by military 
commission.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on Military 
Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 295, 295–96 (2010) (noting the “mountain of popular 
and academic discourse” following the executive order establishing military commissions). 
 3. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (considering Hamdan’s claim that 
the military commission convened by President Bush lacked the authority to try him); Khadr v. 
Bush, 587 F. Supp. 2d 225 (D.D.C. 2008) (considering whether Khadr’s upcoming trial before a 
military commission was unlawful). 
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history of military commissions and whether they comply with the 
requirements of the Constitution, federal statutes, and the law of war.4 
We all profit from this rich vein of scholarly and judicial ore, but I would 
like to offer another perspective from which to examine the current generation 
of commissions: Is the military commission system, quite simply, too small to 
be viable?  Answering this question, which has not yet been addressed directly 
in the literature, requires identification of the purposes of justice systems and 
how those purposes are achieved in civilian court systems. 
With that as a predicate, it should be possible to gauge the reality, rather 
the theory, of the administration of justice by military commissions.  As I will 
also explain, by invoking a military adjudicatory model at a time when the 
country was not on a war footing,5 the Bush Administration sealed the fate of 
the military commission system.  He asked of it more than it could deliver.  
Despite remedial efforts by the Obama Administration, the defect persists and 
is by now incurable. 
I.  THE SATISFACTORY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
What is it that makes a judicial system satisfactory?  At bottom, it is a 
matter of public confidence in the system’s administration of justice.6  This can 
be gauged by looking at discrete factors, to which I will turn in a moment, but 
it also entails an overall judgment that may be—no, is—more than the sum of 
its parts.  Whether a system can be satisfactory without fostering public 
confidence is another issue that is worth considering; in a democratic society 
one would like to believe that a system that enjoys public confidence would 
also be satisfactory, but the two concepts are not identical. 
One can imagine a judicial system that seems satisfactory but does not 
engender public confidence.  For example, suppose a system enjoyed a very 
high batting average for convicting only the objectively guilty and acquitting 
only the objectively innocent, and, in cases of conviction, for dispensing 
sentences that were neither extravagantly onerous nor notably lenient.  If that is 
all one knew, the system might be viewed as satisfactory, but would scarcely 
foster public confidence in the administration of justice.  Thus, suppose the 
outcomes referred to were achieved without public access to the proceedings, 
 
 4. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 590–93; Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, 
and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 590–95 (2010); Vladeck, supra note 2, at 296–
98. 
 5. See JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR 
TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 87, 89 (2008); Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 
113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1873 (2004). 
 6. This is a universal value.  E.g., Kemal Bedri & Elena Baylis, Constructing Credibility, 6 
GREEN BAG 2D 399, 409 (2003) (quoting Pres. Bedri of Ethiopian Federal Supreme Court) (“I 
want us to be credible in the eyes of the public.  That is our biggest challenge.”). 
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only at prodigious expense, or only with grave delays.  Alternatively, suppose 
there were no protection against bribing jurors or judges—or no particular 
protection for judicial independence.  Suppose the rules of decision and 
procedure, while entirely reasonable (and such that they would be approved by 
an overwhelming majority of the voters), were unfamiliar and arrived at by a 
secret process. 
An entirely different set of questions emerges if the goal is not public 
confidence in the administration of justice, but something else—such as 
victory over a dangerous adversary. 
The long debate over post-9/11 military commissions raises the question 
whether the normal yardstick is the one to which we ought to be referring.  
From this perspective, what proves to be satisfactory may have far less to do 
with procedural regularity and transparency, and far more to do with disabling 
armed adversaries bent on violence against our country, its inhabitants, and its 
interests.  It must be said that this alternative objective becomes less plausible 
where, as in the case of the United States during the decade since 9/11, the 
country is on a war footing in name only.7  Aside from the selfless labors of 
our military personnel and the sacrifice of their immediate families, the 
occasional National Guard and Reserve personnel at train and bus stations in 
our great metropolitan areas, and high spending for defense, there is little 
outward domestic evidence that the United States is at war. 
The choice between these two definitions of what makes for a satisfactory 
system of justice lurks in any consideration of the arrangements the George W. 
Bush Administration put in place in 2001 for military commissions8 and those 
Congress later cemented into the United States Code with the Military 
Commissions Acts (“MCAs”) of 20069 and 2009.10  Those who believe that the 
military commission system primarily serves the interest in fostering public 
confidence in national defense and national security programs rather than the 
interest in fostering public confidence in the administration of justice will be 
more likely to look to outcomes than to institutions and processes.  Those, 
however, are the aspects on which I will focus. 
 
 7. See Ackerman, supra note 5, at 1873. 
 8. See Military Order of November 13, 2001, supra note 1. 
 9. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
 10. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 
1801–07, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (2009) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950t 
(2010)). 
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II.  COMMISSION REALITIES 
Since their re-establishment, the military commissions have adjudicated a 
grand total of seven cases.11  Of those cases, five involved pretrial agreements 
and guilty pleas, the sixth defendant pleaded not guilty but mounted no 
defense, and the last was contested.12  Five of those convicted remain at 
Guantánamo.13  No cases were decided by the now-defunct non-statutory 
Review Panel established in 2002,14 and only two cases have been the subject 
of final decisions by the United States Court of Military Commission Review 
created by the Military Commissions Act of 2006.15  There have been no 
acquittals at trial, and no convictions have been reversed by either the 
convening authority or on appellate review.16  Only two additional cases, 
involving six individuals, are currently headed for trial by military 
commission.17  They arise out of the 9/11 attacks and the attack on the USS 
Cole.18 
The overall cost of the commissions is unknown, but is surely in the many 
millions of dollars, including such expenses as court and detention facility 
 
 11. By the Numbers, MIAMI HERALD, http://www.miamiherald.com/2007/11/27/322461/by-
the-numbers.html (last updated Apr. 2, 2012). 
 12. The cases of David Hicks, Omar Khadr, Noor Uthman Mohammed, Ibrahim al Qosi, and 
Majid Khan were disposed of with pretrial agreements and/or guilty pleas.  Id.  Defendant Ali 
Hamza al Bahlul was represented by counsel, but insisted that nothing be done on his behalf and 
even held up a boycott sign at his arraignment.  David J.R. Frakt, The Practice of Criminal Law 
in the Guantánamo Military Commissions, 67 A.F. L. REV. 35, 71–72, 85 (2011).  Salim Hamdan 
was convicted after a contested trial.  Id. at 38 n.9. 
 13. Carol Rosenberg, No Vacancy at Guantánamo, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 19, 2011, at 4A. 
 14. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Military Comm’n Order No. 1 § 6(H)(4) (Mar. 21, 2002); 
[hereinafter Military Comm’n Order No. 1]; see U.S. Court of Military Commissions Review 
(USCMCR) History, OFF. MIL. COMMISSIONS, http://www.mc.mil/ABOUTUS/USCMCR 
History.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2012) (explaining that Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 
(2006) invalidated the non-statutory Review Panel before it was able to decide any cases); see 
also NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, ANNOTATED GUIDE: PROCEDURES FOR TRIALS BY 
MILITARY COMMISSIONS OF CERTAIN NON-UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE WAR AGAINST 
TERRORISM 73–75 (2002). 
 15. 10 U.S.C. § 950f (Supp. IV 2011); see supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 16. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
 17. Military Commissions Cases, OFF. MILITARY COMMISSIONS, http://www.mc.mil/ 
CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2012) (showing that the “active” cases 
listed as “Abd al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed Abdu Al-Nashiri (2)” and “Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed et al (2),” charging five individuals jointly, are headed for trial by military 
commission, while “Majid Shoukat Khan” has entered into a pretrial agreement).  As of March 
10, 2012, the Office of Military Commissions website listed three cases as “pending/active” 
(including one that is apparently being treated as active while the government determines whether 
the defendant has fulfilled his obligations under a pretrial agreement).  Id.  Another five are listed 
as “pending/inactive.”  Id. 
 18. Id. (charges accessed by clicking “Abd al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed Abdu Al-Nashiri 
(2)” and “Khalid Sheikh Mohammed et al (2)”). 
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construction, security, personnel pay and allowances, transportation, and 
drills.19  Even if allowance is made for the fact that only a handful of the 
Guantánamo detainees will ever enter the military commission system, on a 
per-case basis, this is expensive justice. 
Apart from an unsuccessful effort to obtain prejudgment review by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,20 that 
court has not yet had occasion to exercise its statutory appellate jurisdiction 
over military commissions.21  Without explanation, Congress excluded the 
underworked United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces from the 
appellate review of military commissions,22 and that court has refused to 
exercise its power under the All Writs Act in a commission case.23 
There have been three appointing (or convening) authorities, exercising the 
power to create military commissions and review their proceedings.  Of the 
three, one has been a civilian,24 one has been a retired major general serving as 
a civilian,25 and the incumbent is a retired Navy vice admiral who has been 
recalled to active duty for this purpose.26  There have been three legal advisors 
to the appointing or convening authority.  One of those was disqualified 
because he had improperly sought to exert command influence over a chief 
 
 19. According to a 2010 estimate, at least $500 million has been spent on renovations at 
Guantánamo.  Scott Higham & Peter Finn, Camp Costly, WASH. POST, June 7, 2010, at A1.  
$13.4 million was spent on a courthouse complex called the Expeditionary Judicial Facility, to 
provide a second courtroom, which has been used only once.  Amnesty Int’l, Close Gitmo and 
Help Solve the Debt Crisis, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
amnesty-international/close-gitmo-and-help-solv_b_934236.html.  The original solicitation was 
more ambitious, and contemplated a cost range of $75–125 million for design and construction of 
the legal compound.  U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, Legal Compound at U.S. Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
FED. BUS. OPPORTUNITIES (Nov. 3, 2006), https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity& mode= 
form&id=367839984085f5b06f6a48f1470d3452&tab=core&_cview=0.  For a description of a 
2011 Guantánamo drill, see Carol Rosenberg, Weather, Technology Bedevil Trial’s Dry Run, 
MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 14, 2011, at 3A. 
 20. Khadr v. United States, 529 F.3d 1112, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 21. 10 U.S.C. § 950g (Supp. IV 2011). 
 22. See Eugene R. Fidell, Appellate Review of Military Commissions, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 
8, 2009), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/10/in-coming-weeks-there-will-be-no.html, reprinted 
in 2010 GREEN BAG ALMANAC & READER 257, 258 (2009); see also Eugene R. Fidell, The Next 
Judge, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 303, 305 (2011). 
 23. Al Qosi v. Altenburg, 60 M.J. 461, 461–62 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (mem.). 
 24. See Susan J. Crawford: Convening Authority for Military Commissions, U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., http://www.defense.gov/news/d20070207crawford.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).  Susan 
J. Crawford served for fifteen years on the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.  Id. 
 25.  See John D. Altenburg, Jr.: Appointing Authority for Military Commissions, U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/news/Dec2003/d20031230altenburg.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 
2012). 
 26. Senior Executive Service Appointments and Reassignments, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Mar. 
30, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=13418. 
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prosecutor.27  The legal advisors have been a retired colonel,28 a retired 
brigadier general who was recalled to active duty,29 and a reserve brigadier 
general.30 
Personnel turbulence has been a serious concern.  There have been six 
chief prosecutors31 and five chief defense counsel,32 aided by dozens of other 
military prosecutors and military and civilian defense counsel, provided by the 
government at no expense to the defendants.33  Numerous civilian defense 
 
 27. United States v. Hamdan, 1 M.C. 78, 87, 90 (Military Comm’n 2008); William 
Glaberson, Judge’s Guantánamo Ruling Bodes Ill for System, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2008, at 26. 
 28. Military Commissions Appointments Announced, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Sept. 19, 2008), 
http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=12222 (Michael Chapman). 
 29. Military Commission Legal Advisor Announced, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Dec. 30, 2003), 
http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=5896 (Thomas L. Hemingway). 
 30. Military Commissions Appointments Announced, supra note 28 (Thomas W. Hartmann); 
see also Brigadier General Thomas W. Hartmann, U.S. AIR FORCE, http://web.archive.org/ web/ 
20070915074851/http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=10078 (last visted Mar. 20, 2012). 
 31. See Gerry J. Gilmore, Defense, Prosecution Chiefs Differ as Guantanamo Arraignment 
Ends, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (June 6, 2008), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx? 
ID=50121 (indicating Army Colonel Lawrence Morris was chief prosecutor for the Office of 
Military Commissions); Key Military Commission Officials Announced, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. 
(Apr. 20, 2004), http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7278 (naming Army 
Colonel Robert L. Swann as Army Colonel Fred Borch’s replacement for chief prosecutor for the 
Office of Military Commissions); New Military Commissions Chief Prosecutor Announced, U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF. (June 23, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=14598 
(naming Army Brigadier General Mark Martins as Navy Captain John Murphy’s replacement for 
chief prosecutor for the Office of Military Commissions); Sara Wood, Prosecutor: Hicks Case 
Good Start for Military Commissions, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Mar. 31, 2007), http://www.defense. 
gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=32659 (indicating Air Force Colonel Morris Davis was chief 
prosecutor for the Office of Military Commissions). 
 32. See Flag and General Officer Announcements, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (July 12, 2001), 
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=2969 (indicating Marine Corps Colonel 
Kevin M. Sandkuhler was chief defense counsel for the Office of Military Commissions); Gerry 
J. Gilmore, Defense, Prosecution Chiefs Differ as Guantanamo Arraignment Ends, U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF. (June 6, 2008), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=50121 (indicating 
Army Colonel Steven David was chief defense counsel for the Office of Military Commissions); 
New Military Commissions Chief Prosecutor Announced, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (June 23, 2011), 
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=14598 (indicating Marine Colonel 
Jeffrey Colwell would continue as chief defense counsel for the Office of Military Commissions); 
Doug Sample, Military Commission Chief Prosecutor, Defense Counsel Introduced, U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEF. (May 23, 2003), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=28951 (indicating 
Air Force Colonel Will Gunn was chief defense counsel for the Office of Military Commissions); 
Sara Wood, Charges Dismissed Against Canadian at Guantanamo, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (June 4, 
2007), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=46281 (indicating Marine Colonel 
Dwight Sullivan was chief defense counsel for the Office of Military Commissions). 
 33.  See Carol Rosenberg, Guantanamo Lawyers Aren’t Happy with New Work Rules, 
MCCLATCHY (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/03/18/110710/guantanamo-
lawyers-arent-happy.html (noting that the Pentagon has provided both military and civilian 
lawyers for “alleged war criminals” at no cost to defendants). 
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counsel from private and public interest law firms have also participated,34 as 
have civilian federal prosecutors on loan from the Department of Justice.35 
There have been fourteen military judges of the military commissions,36 
four members of the Review Panel,37 and twenty-five judges of the Court of 
Military Commission Review.38  All eight current appellate military judges are 
on loan from their normal duties as judges of the service Courts of Criminal 
Appeals.39  The Review Panel members did not have fixed terms of office.40  
Trial and appellate military judges under the MCA also do not enjoy terms of 
office as such.  Rather, “[e]ach appellate military judge assigned to the 
USCMCR shall remain assigned to the Court unless reassigned, retired or 
separated from active duty pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 949b(b)(4).”41 The Chief 
 
 34. See Stacy Sullivan, The Minutes of the Guantanamo Bay Bar Association, N.Y. MAG., 
June 26, 2006, at 44, 46. 
 35. Gitmo Cases Referred to U.S. Prosecutors, MSNBC.COM (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.ms 
nbc.msn.com/id/32274673/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/gitmo-cases-referred-us-prosecutors/. 
 36. At this writing there are twelve.  Biographical data for all but one may be found at 
Military Judges’ Biographies, MIAMI HERALD http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2008/04/02/ 
10/judgesbios.source.prod_affiliate.56.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).  The holdout, Colonel 
Patrick J. Parrish, declined to make his data public.  Id.  Previously, Navy Captain Daniel E. 
O’Toole was a military judge, Military Commission Charges Referred, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Dec. 
19, 2005), http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9177, as was Colonel Robert 
S. Chester, Military Commission Charges Referred, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Jan. 20, 2006), 
http://www.defense. gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9248. 
 37. Military Commission Review Panel Members to be Designated and Instruction Issued, 
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Dec. 30, 2003), http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?Release 
ID=5897. 
 38. United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1253 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011) (naming 
Judges Ronald Gregory and William Orr, Jr.); Motion to Attach, Attach. A–B, United States v. 
Khadr, No. 07-001 (U.S.C.M.C.R. July 19, 2007), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
archives/Khadr%20attachments%207-19-07.pdf (naming Judges Amy Bechtold, Griffin Bell, 
John Rolph, Lisa Schenck, Dawn Scholz, and Steven Walburn); NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY 
JUSTICE, 2 MILITARY COMMISSION REPORTER, at xiii (2011) (naming Judges Barbara G. Brand, 
David L. Conn, Theresa A. Gallagher, John B. Hoffman, Joseph R. Perlak, Eric C. Price, Martin 
L. Sims, and Cheryl H. Thompson); NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, 1 MILITARY 
COMMISSION REPORTER 401 (2009) (naming Judges Edward G. Beister, Jr., William T. Coleman, 
John F. Feltman, David R. Francis, Eric E. Geiser, Paul P. Holden, Jr., Daniel E. O’Toole, 
Annamary Sullivan, Frank J. Williams). 
 39. See Jason Jones, Navy Judges Lend Expertise to the Court of Military Commission 
Review, JAG MAG., Winter 2007, at 18, 18, available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/news/jag_mag/ 
archive/2007_Winter/2007_Winter_JAGMAG.pdf.  The positions of Chief Judge and Deputy 
Chief Judge are vacant.  See Judges U.S. Court of Military Commission Review, OFF. MIL. 
COMMISSIONS (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/Judges%20Assigned%20to%20USC 
MCR%20as%20of%20Oct.%2011,%202011.pdf. 
 40. NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 73 (noting that Review Panel 
members “serve at the will of the Secretary of Defense”). 
 41. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REGULATION FOR TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION § 25-2(c) 
(2011) [hereinafter REGULATION FOR TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION], available at 
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Judge is appointed by the Secretary of Defense and serves for two years, with 
reappointment at the Secretary’s unfettered discretion.42  One trial judge left 
office because he was a retired regular Army officer who had been recalled to 
active duty and the Army did not extend his recall.43 
Although (thanks to me) many lawyers who have been involved in the 
military commissions proudly sport baseball caps bearing the legend 
“Guantanamo Bay Bar Association,”44 and although there seem to be two rump 
groups using that name,45 there is actually no organized military commissions 
bar at either the trial or appellate level.  Members of any state or federal bar 
may practice before the commissions,46 and those appearing before the Court 
of Military Commission Review and the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit must be admitted by those courts.47 
There is no single professional responsibility body to which an attorney 
practicing before military commissions may turn for guidance.  Military 
commissions have engendered a welter of ethical issues both before and after 
enactment of the MCAs, including intrusion on the professional independence 
of both prosecutors and defense counsel,48 participation in proceedings 
believed to be fundamentally flawed,49 conflicts of interest,50 extrajudicial 
 
http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/2011%20Regulation.pdf.  Army and Coast Guard appellate military 
judges have protected terms of office as such, under service regulations.  See United States v. 
Paulk, 66 M.J. 641, 642 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2008). 
 42. REGULATION FOR TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION, supra note 41, § 25-2(d). 
 43. See United States v. Khadr, 1 M.C. 246, 246 (Military Comm’n 2008); E-mail from 
Ralph H. Kohlmann, C.J., Military Comm’ns Trial Judiciary, to William Sowder Attorney 
Advisor, Military Comm’ns Trial Judicary (June 2, 2008, 9:03 AM), available at http://www.dod. 
mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/MilitaryCommisions/MilitaryCommissions.pdf. 
 44. See Lynne Duke, Statutes of Liberty: Michael Ratner Is in Hot Pursuit of Justice for 
Guantanamo Detainees, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2003, at C1. 
 45. See Legal Eagles (photograph of Capt. Patrick McCarthy addressing the Guantanamo 
Bay Bar Association), in GUANTANAMO BAY GAZETTE, Nov. 24, 2006, at 8, available at 
http://www.cnic.navy.mil/navycni/groups/public/@cnrse/@gtmo/documents/document/cnic_048
676.pdf; Sullivan, supra note 34, at 46. 
 46. Military Comm’n Order No. 1, supra note 14, § 4(C)(3)(b). 
 47. FED. R. APP. P. 46(a); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., COURT OF MILITARY COMMISSION REVIEW 
RULES OF PRACTICE 8(a) (2008) [hereinafter MILITARY COMMISSION REVIEW RULES OF 
PRACTICE], available at http://www.mc.mil/DesktopModules/cmcr/cmcr/pdf/USCMCR%20 
Rules%20of%20Practice%20%282008%29.pdf. 
 48. E.g., Morris D. Davis, AWOL Military Justice, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at A15 (chief 
prosecutor); Navy Lawyer Who Faulted Guantánamo Is Reassigned, N.Y. TIMES,  (Apr. 4, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/us/politics/05gitmo.html (defense counsel). 
 49. See generally Mary Cheh, Should Lawyers Participate in Rigged Systems? The Case of 
the Military Commissions, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L & POL’Y 375 (2005) (arguing the requirements and 
restrictions placed on civilian defense attorneys participating in the military commissions make it 
impossible to provide adequate and ethical representation). 
 50. Compare David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantánamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1981, 2007–14 (2008) (outlining the conflicts potentially created by the Office of Military 
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statements by counsel,51 unlawful command influence,52 and the duties of 
defense counsel where the client wishes to dispense with their services.53  
Ethical issues arising from military commissions have been the subject of 
rulings by both military service and state professional responsibility 
authorities.54  A disturbing number of military commission prosecutors and 
defense counsel have withdrawn for ethical reasons.55 
A few uniformed defense counsel are said to have been passed over for 
promotion as a result of their zealous representation of commission clients.56  
The Department of the Navy refused to convene a special selection board to 
consider remedial promotion in one such case (involving David Hicks’s 
zealous and effective Marine defense counsel),57 but that decision was 
 
Counsel-Defense and explaining one specific conflict that was created for an attorney who 
worked there), with Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. & Linell A. Letendre, Military Lawyering and 
Professional Independence in the War on Terror: A Response to David Luban, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
417, 431–32 (2008) (arguing that Professor Luban made more “of the conflict of interest that 
allegedly exists” than was necessary). 
 51. See generally Seth R. Deam, Does Labeling the System “Unfair” Threaten Fairness? 
Trial Publicity Rules for Defense Attorneys in Military Commissions, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
663 (2006) (focusing on two extrajudicial statements made by U.S. Marine Corps Major Michal 
Mori while acting as defense counsel for detainee David Hicks and analyzing the sources and 
scope of his ethical responsibilities as related to those statements). 
 52. United States v. Hamdan, 1 M.C. 78, 86–87 (Military Comm’n 2008). 
 53. See Matthew Ivey, Challenges Presented to Military Lawyers Representing Detainees in 
the War on Terrorism, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211, 221–23 (2010).  Compare Iowa State 
Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Ethics & Practice Guidelines, Op. 05-07 (2006), available at http://www.ia 
bar.net/ethics.nsf/e61beed77a215f6686256497004ce492/d0aa62c34b061a16862573b000158047?
OpenDocument (concluding it is ethical to comply with a military court order assigning a lawyer 
to represent a detainee who does not wish to be represented), with ABA Comm. on Ethics & 
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-448, at 5 n.18 (2007) (disagreeing with Iowa opinion), 
available at http://www2.americanbar.org/sections/criminaljustice/CR209750/PublicDocuments/ 
formalop.pdf. 
 54. See, e.g., Hamdan, 1 M.C. at 90 (disqualifying the legal advisor to the convening 
authority of the military commission for exerting unlawful command influence); Iowa State Bar 
Ass’n, Comm. on Ethics & Practice Guidelines, supra note 53.  For an insightful review of the 
federal-state complexities that may arise, see C. Peter Dungan, Avoiding “Catch-22s”: 
Approaches to Resolve Conflicts Between Military and State Bar Rules of Professional 
Responsibility, 30 J. LEGAL PROF. 31, 46–50 (2006). 
 55. See Shayana Kadidal, Confronting Ethical Issues in National Security Cases: The 
Guantánamo Habeas Litigation, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1397, 1413–14 (2011). 
 56. E.g., Editorial, The Cost of Doing Your Duty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at A26. 
 57. Mori v. Dep’t of the Navy, 731 F. Supp. 2d 43, 44 (D.D.C. 2010), appeal dismissed, No. 
10-5344, 2010 WL 5371504, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 2010); see also Luban, supra note 50, at 
2014–19; Ellen Yaroshefsky, Military Lawyering at the Edge of the Rule of Law at Guantanamo: 
Should Lawyers be Permitted to Violate the Law?, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 573–74 (2007). 
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remanded for further proceedings,58 and Major Mori was promoted to 
lieutenant colonel and elevated to the military trial bench.59 
The governing rules are today found in the 2009 Military Commissions 
Act,60 the Manual for Military Commissions,61 and the Regulation for Trial by 
Military Commission,62 the latter two of which are issued under the authority 
of the Secretary of Defense.63  With minor exception, the Military Commission 
Instructions that applied to the pre-MCA commissions were issued without 
opportunity for public notice and comment.64  Nor were the 2007 and 2010 
Manuals for Military Commissions subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
even though the parallel document for courts-martial—the Manual for Courts-
Martial—has routinely been the product of notice-and-comment procedures 
since the Carter Administration.65  The George W. Bush Administration 
successfully resisted efforts under the Freedom of Information Act66 to obtain 
comments received informally by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld 
on the Military Commission Instructions.67  Despite its claimed liberalization 
 
 58. Mori, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 44. 
 59. Alison Caldwell, Promotion for Hicks’ US Military Lawyer, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. 
NEWS (June 12, 2009), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-06-12/promotion-for-hicks-us-military-
lawyer/1712062.  Other military commission defense counsel have also been promoted.  David J. 
R. Frakt, Mohammed Jawad and the Military Commissions of Guantánamo, 60 DUKE L.J. 1367, 
1409 & n.213 (2011). 
 60. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801–
07, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (2009) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950t (2010)). 
 61. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2010) [hereinafter 
MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS], available at http://www.defense.gov/news/d2010man 
ual.pdf. 
 62. REGULATION FOR TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION, supra note 41. 
 63. See Ashton B. Carter, Foreword to REGULATION FOR TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION, 
supra note 41; Robert M. Gates, Foreword to MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, supra note 
61. 
 64. Eugene R. Fidell, Military Commissions & Administrative Law, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 379, 
382–84 (2003) [hereinafter Fidell, Military Commissions & Administrative Law]. 
 65. See Eugene R. Fidell, Limitations of the Military Commissions Structure, NAT’L INST. 
MIL. JUST. BLOG (June 19, 2010, 6:53 PM), http://www.nimjblog.org/2010/06/limitations-of-
military-commissions.html.  The process, which is voluntary on the part of the Defense 
Department, see id. at 386 & n.41 (citing Kevin J. Barry, Modernizing the Manual for Courts-
Martial Rule-Making Process: A Work in Progress, 165 MIL. L. REV. 237 (2000)), is prescribed 
in 32 C.F.R. pt. 152 (2010). 
 66. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 67. Nat’l Inst. of Military Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 512 F.3d 677, 678–79, 687 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008). 
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of FOIA policy,68 the Obama Administration refused to release the withheld 
comments when requested to do so.69 
There are rules of practice for the Court of Military Commission Review,70 
but they were issued without notice-and-comment rulemaking or reliance on a 
rules committee that involved anyone outside the government.71  Similarly, 
trial court rules for the military commissions,72 like the critical 2007 and 2011 
versions of the Regulation for Trial by Military Commission, were issued 
without opportunity for public notice and comment.73 
Rulings of military judges are not routinely handed out in court following 
announcement from the bench.74  The Defense Department long maintained a 
military commissions page on its website75 and posted pertinent documents 
there following security review.  Documents were posted haphazardly and 
late.76  Opinions issued by military judges in connection with military 
commission trials are published only in the unofficial Military Commission 
 
 68. Freedom of Information Act, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683, 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009) (“In the face of doubt, openness prevails.”). 
 69. Eugene R. Fidell, Preface to 3 NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, MILITARY 
COMMISSION INSTRUCTIONS SOURCEBOOK, at x (2009). 
 70. See MILITARY COMMISSION REVIEW RULES OF PRACTICE, supra note 47. 
 71. See U.S. COURT OF MILITARY COMM’N REVIEW, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 08-02 
(2008), available at http://www.mc.mil/DesktopModules/cmcr/cmcr/pdf/USCMCR%20Rules% 
20of%20Practice%20%282008%29.pdf (indicating that the rules were issued “[b]y direction of 
the Chief Judge, after consultation with the other judges of the Court [of Military Commissions 
Review],” and implying no additional consultation with anyone outside the government). 
 72. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MILITARY COMMISSIONS TRIAL JUDICIARY RULES OF COURT 
(2007), available at http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/MCTJRulesofCourt.pdf. 
 73. See Letter from Nat’l Inst. of Military Justice, Nat’l Assoc. of Criminal Def. Lawyers, 
Am. Civil Liberties Union, Int’l Justice Network, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, & The 
Constitution Project, to Hon. Robert M. Gates, Sec’y of Def., Dep’t of Def. (April 12, 2011) (on 
file with author) (explaining that in 2011, months before the 2011 version of the Regulation for 
Trial by Military Commission was issued, the military commissions still had not opened up their 
rulemaking process to non-governmental bodies). 
 74. See Eugene R. Fidell, Brig-adoon: Report from Guantánamo, Dec. 1–5, 2009, 2 NIMJ 
REP. FROM GUANTÁNAMO, 2010, at 29, 32 [hereinafter Fidell, Brig-adoon]. 
 75. The former military commissions page has been removed from the Defense Department 
website.  A new site, www.mc.mil, was unveiled on September 28, 2011, and is discussed below. 
 76. For example, the important September 9, 2011 decision of the Court of Military 
Commission Review in United States v. al Bahlul, No. CMCR 09–001, 2011 WL 4916373 
(U.S.C.M.C.R. Sept. 9, 2011), available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/USCourtofMilitaryCom 
missionReview.aspx, was not posted until well over a week later, even though it freely circulated 
among lawyers and was immediately available on the Miami Herald website.  See Carol 
Rosenberg, Panel Upholds Al Qaida Filmmaker’s Life Sentence, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 10, 
2011), http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/09/09/2399378/military-court-upholds-al-qaida.html 
(containing a link to the court’s decision). 
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Reporter, issued by the private National Institute of Military Justice.77  
Decisions of the Court of Military Commission Review are on occasion 
published in West’s Federal Supplement 2d,78 as well as the Military 
Commission Reporter.79  A few of the decisions have addressed matters of 
substance.  The appellate decisions in the Hamdan80 and al Bahlul81 cases 
reveal seriousness of purpose, although one might wonder about citing, for 
example, Mubarak-era Egyptian legislation (as the al Bahlul court did)82 in 
seeking to show that material support for terrorism is widely recognized as a 
punishable offense. 
All of the post-9/11 military commissions have been conducted in 
courtrooms located at the United States Naval Station, Guantánamo Bay, 
Cuba.83  One of the courtrooms includes state-of-the-art equipment84 and is 
reserved for cases involving so-called “high-value detainees” such as Khalid 
Sheik Muhammed.85  Proceedings of the Court of Military Commission 
Review have been held at the National Courts Building in Washington, D.C., 
in a courtroom normally used by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit.86 
Travel to and from Guantánamo Bay is strictly regulated by the Defense 
Department, and private citizens may not board either commercial or 
government flights without government approval.87  Private citizens permitted 
to attend commission trials are closely regulated in their ability to move about 
 
 77. See 1 M.C. (2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/60447251/1MC; 2 M.C. (3d 
Cum. Pamphlet 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/60444255/2MC3PAM. 
 78. E.g., United States v. Khadr, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2008); United States 
v. Khadr, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2007); United States v. Khadr, 717 F. Supp. 2d 
1212 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2007); United States v. Khadr, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2007). 
 79. E.g., United States v. Khadr, 1 M.C. 467 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2008); United States v. Khadr, 1 
M.C. 443 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2007); United States v. Khadr, 1 M.C. 440 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2007); 
United States v. Khadr, 1 M.C. 431 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2007). 
 80. See generally United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 2 M.C. 88 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 
2011) (affirming Hamdan’s sentence and the military commission’s findings). 
 81. See generally al Bahlul, 2011 WL 4916373 (affirming al Bahlul’s sentence and the 
military commission’s findings). 
 82. Id. at *35. 
 83. Facilities, OFF. MIL. COMMISSIONS, http://www.mc.mil/FACILITIESSERVICES/Facili 
ties.aspx (last visited Mar. 11, 2012). 
 84. See generally Shanita Simmons, Technology to Help Deliver State-of-the Art Judicial 
Proceedings, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO (Oct. 31, 2007), http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom. 
mil/storyarchive/2007/October/103107-1-courtroom21.html. 
 85. See 157 CONG. REC. S2877 (daily ed. May 11, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kelly Ayotte). 
 86. U.S. Court of Military Commissions Review History, OFF. MIL. COMMISSIONS, 
http://www.mc.mil/ABOUTUS/USCMCRHistory.aspx (last visited Mar. 11, 2012). 
 87. Frequently Asked Questions, OFF. MIL. COMMISSIONS, http://www.mc.mil/ABOUTUS/ 
FAQs.aspx (last visited Mar. 11, 2012). 
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the base.88  A few non-governmental organizations, such as the ACLU, Human 
Rights Watch, Human Rights First, NIMJ, Amnesty International, and the 
Heritage Foundation, are on an official list of approved observers and are 
afforded free transportation to Guantánamo via Andrews Air Force Base 
(AFB), Maryland.89  One observer has written: 
Following the conclusion of the hearing, it struck me that the entire court had 
been transported from the Washington, DC, metro area to Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, via chartered airliner and spent nearly four days on base at Guantanamo 
for a hearing that lasted barely over an hour.  While I grant that those involved 
in the proceedings do this on a regular basis out of a sense of duty to both the 
nation and the fair administration of justice, this use of resources is clearly 
inefficient.90 
Even though Guantánamo can only be reached—unless you are in the 
Navy or Coast Guard—by airplane and only with the affirmative approval of 
the government, and even though visitors are closely monitored, courthouse 
security, provided by military personnel, is tighter than that found in post-9/11 
federal courthouses.  Proceedings are conducted behind soundproof glass “so 
that the audio feed can be delayed in case classified information needs to be 
censored.”91  On a few occasions involving high-value detainees, family 
members of victims of the 9/11 attacks were flown to Guantánamo to observe 
the proceedings.92 
Journalists are permitted to attend all open proceedings of both the military 
commissions and the Court of Military Commission Review.93  They pay $400 
 
 88. See Elizabeth Hillman, Report from Guantánamo, Apr. 6–9, 2010, in 3 NIMJ REP. FROM 
GUANTÁNAMO, 2010, at 3, 3. 
 89. Kelli Stout, Dispatch from GTMO, SETON HALL L., http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/ 
PublicIntGovServ/policyresearch/reporting-from-guantanamo.cfm (last visited Mar. 11, 2012). 
 90. Michael Orlando, Report from Guantánamo, June 28–July 1, 2010, in 3 NIMJ REP. 
FROM GUANTÁNAMO, 2010, at 14, 15; see also Fidell, Brig-adoon, supra note 74, at 30.  The 
pace of the proceedings is slow at best.  As New York attorney Ronald W. Meister has 
commented, “[i]t was hard to avoid the feeling that the quality of mercy in these proceedings was 
being strained through a colander filled with molasses.”  Ronald W. Meister, Report from 
Guantánamo, Nov. 16–19, 2009, in 2 NIMJ REP. FROM GUANTÁNAMO, 2010, at 26, 28. 
 91. Sharon Weinberger, Doling Out Justice at Gitmo: An Inside Look, AOL NEWS (July 1, 
2010, 10:21 AM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/07/01/gitmo-courtroom-a-question-of-justice-
and-security/.  The delay “has been advertised as 20 seconds” but one observer thought it was 
“much longer than that, perhaps a minute or so.”  Hillman, supra note 88, at 4.  The delay 
anticipated for remote telecasts will be 40 seconds.  Carol Rosenberg, More Public Viewing of 
Trial Proposed, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 6, 2011, at 3A [hereinafter Rosenberg, More Public 
Viewing of Trial Proposed]. 
 92. William Glaberson, 5 Charged in 9/11 Attacks Seek to Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 
2008, at A1; Rosenberg, supra note 91. 
 93. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MEDIA GROUND RULES FOR GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA (GTMO) 
7–8 (2010), available at www.mc.mil/Portals/0/MILCOMMediaGroundRules.pdf. 
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each for a round-trip ticket on the military flights out of Andrews AFB, and are 
subject to extensive, and in some cases arbitrary, shifting rules.94  In one 
episode in 2010, four reporters were told they would not be permitted to return 
to Guantánamo after they filed stories naming an interrogator who testified 
anonymously but whose name (Joshua R. Claus) had previously been disclosed 
in Canada in connection with disciplinary proceedings to which he had been 
subjected.95  The Defense Department eventually relented and the expulsion 
order was rescinded,96 but the rules governing the reporters’ work remain 
unclear. 
Competent foreign language interpretation has been a challenge from the 
beginning of the military commissions.97  A courtroom design contract with 
the Center for Legal and Court Technology at William & Mary Law School 
included “new technology [that] provides an audio and television monitoring 
system that eliminates the need for translators to [be] physically present in the 
courtroom.”98 
III.  REBRANDING 
Professor Muneer Ahmad has written compellingly about early (pre-MCA) 
military commission system miscues as well as the steps taken by the 
government to try to legitimize the commissions.  In his account, the military 
commissions got off to a rocky start: 
  Despite the protests of defense lawyers, the commissions operated with 
virtually no rules of evidence, no discovery rules, no rules of decision, and no 
rules regarding precedent.  Thus, not only was positive law in short supply, so, 
too, was any sense as to what interpretive practices would be followed by the 
commissions or what precedential value a decision in one commission would 
have in the same trial, in another trial before the same presiding officer, or in a 
trial before a different presiding officer.  While any newly created legal system 
is bound to encounter initial problems, the failure of the commission system to 
 
 94. See Carol Rosenberg, Commentary: For Reporters, the Rules at Guantánamo Change 
Daily, MIAMI HERALD, (July 26, 2010), http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/07/26/1819939/com 
mentary-for-reporters-the-rules.html [hereinafter Rosenberg, Rules at Guantánamo Change 
Daily] (“This is a court like none other I’ve ever seen.”). 
 95. Eugene R. Fidell, Military Law, DÆDALUS, Summer 2011, at 165, 169 & 175 n.33 
[hereinafter Fidell, Military Law] (citing On the Media: “Veteran Reporter Barred from 
Guantanamo” (NPR radio broadcast May 14, 2010), available at http://www.onthemedia.org/tran 
scripts/2010/05/14/01). 
 96. See Eugene R. Fidell, Ten Years On: Military Justice and Civil Liberties in the Post-9/11 
Era, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 103, 108 n.29 (2011/12). 
 97. Simmons, supra note 84. 
 98. Id. 
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contemplate or address these fundamental issues of adjudication suggests how 
poorly designed it was.99 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he commission system lacked rules for the most fundamental 
aspects of a trial, and what rules it had changed at whim. Because the 
system disavowed lineage to any extant common law system, it was 
left no other option than to make up the law as it went along.  This 
“law” consisted of a steady flow of often contradictory directives from 
the Secretary of Defense (“Military Commission Orders”), the 
Department of Defense General Counsel (“Military Commission 
Instructions”), the Appointing Authority (“Appointing Authority 
Regulations” and “Appointing Authority Orders”), and the presiding 
officers (“Presiding Officer Memoranda”).  We were instructed to refer 
to these various rules as “Commission Law,” an invention that by its 
terminology, and capitalization, sought to endow the commissions with 
the majesty and legitimacy of law.  This grasp for the mantle of law 
complemented the hastily decorated commission room and judicially 
costumed presiding officers.100 
Many of the subsequent changes Professor Ahmad describes as “purely 
cosmetic.”101  Requiring judges to wear robes is certainly desirable, but 
gestures like this lose their potency when combined with the kind of trompe 
l’oeil physical arrangements he describes.102  Even steps to self-legitimization 
that might otherwise add to the credibility of the process are offset when those 
trial participants with speaking parts are called upon to use a “script” during 
the proceedings.103 
 
 99. Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantánamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 1683, 1722 (2009).  A good question is why it was so poorly designed.  One 
explanation that comes to mind is that the Bush Administration acted with undue haste in order to 
show that it was being proactive and tough in fighting terrorism in the immediate wake of the 
9/11 attacks.  Another is that poor design was inevitable because of the essential incompatibility 
of the military commission model with contemporary standards for the administration of either 
civilian or military justice. 
 100. Id. at 1728–29 (footnote omitted).  In the end, contrary to the stated guidance of the pre-
MCA presiding officers, “military commission law” wound up permitting reference to 
conventional sources of American law, both civilian and military.  See Eugene R. Fidell, Dwight 
H. Sullivan & Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commission Law, ARMY LAW., Dec. 2005, at 47, 52–53. 
 101. Ahmad, supra note 99, at 1721; see also JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, 
REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND 
DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 328 (2011) (describing government efforts to “legitimate” the 
Guantánamo detentions).  Professors Resnik and Curtis also insightfully situate the iconography 
of the commissions against historical patterns and note the limited openness of the proceedings.  
Id. at 328–33; see also Resnik, supra note 4, at 598–608. 
 102. Ahmad, supra note 99, at 1721. 
 103. Id. at 1721 & n.162; Luban, supra note 50, at 2012 n.138 (quoting CLIVE STAFFORD 
SMITH, EIGHT O’CLOCK FERRY TO THE WINDWARD SIDE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN GUANTÁNAMO 
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Speaking at the Army’s Judge Advocate General’s School twenty years 
ago, Professor David A. Schlueter described the military justice system—the 
system that administers criminal justice for military personnel (and perhaps 
civilians who serve with or accompany them in the field in time of declared 
war or contingency operations)104—as “[a] [l]egal [s]ystem [l]ooking for 
[r]espect.”105 Much the same thing can be said of the military commission 
system.  Indeed, a good case can be made that when he spoke, the court-martial 
system enjoyed greater respect than the military commission system enjoys 
today.  Why that is so need not detain us, although it surely has something to 
do with the long experience the country has had with the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (enacted in 1950),106 as well, perhaps, as the public education 
efforts the highest court of the military justice system has made through its 
“Project Outreach,” repeatedly taking the court on the road over the last several 
decades.107  What is clear is that, even after 10 years, those responsible for the 
revived military commission system continue to believe it needs buttressing, if 
not heroic efforts, if it is to achieve public confidence. 
For example, even before Congress passed the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006, the Bush Administration sought to garner support for military 
commissions by enlisting a variety of distinguished lawyers to comment on the 
concept.  Even though the Defense Department successfully resisted releasing 
their communications under FOIA,108 Secretary Rumsfeld deemed it important 
that the public know their names, presumably to reassure people.  They were a 
lawyer’s Hall of Fame: former Attorney General (and Circuit Judge) Griffin B. 
Bell, former Secretary of Transportation William T. Coleman, Jr., former FBI 
 
BAY 96 (2007)).  For an example of such a script, see Trial Guide for Military Commissions 
(Aug. 17, 2004), http://www.pegc.us/archive/DoD/illegal_commissions/d20040820guide.pdf.  
The use of scripts is normal in courts-martial (indeed, a sample appears in JOINT SERV. COMM. 
ON MILITARY JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES 
app. 8 (2008)), but whether they are desirable is another matter.  They help avert procedural 
errors, but they also tend to put the participants on automatic pilot, thereby compromising 
courtroom spontaneity and alertness. 
 104. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2011), with, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 
(1957) (considering “the power of Congress to expose civilians to trial by military tribunals, 
under military regulations and procedures, for offenses against the United States thereby 
depriving them of trial in civilian courts, under civilian laws and procedures and with all the 
safeguards of the Bill of Rights” and determining that “under our Constitution courts of law alone 
are given power to try civilians for their offenses against the United States”). 
 105. David A. Schlueter, The Twentieth Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Military Justice 
for the 1990’s— A Legal System Looking for Respect, 133 MIL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1991). 
 106. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950) (codified as 
amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2006)). 
 107. E.g., United States v. Lusk, 70 M.J. 278, 279 n.1 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (per curiam) (hearing 
oral arguments at Stanford University School of Law as part of “Project Outreach”). 
 108. Nat’l Inst. of Military Justice v. Dep’t of Def., 512 F.3d 677, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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and CIA Director and federal judge William Webster, former FCC Chairman 
Newton Minow, former White House Counsel Lloyd N. Cutler, former 
Defense Department General Counsels Martin R. Hoffman and Terrence 
O’Donnell, and law professors Ruth Wedgwood and Bernard Meltzer.109  Their 
involvement was not enough to immunize the commissions from severe 
criticism and, ultimately, judicial invalidation.110  Nor did the commissioning 
of Judge Bell, Secretary Coleman, and obscure state judges from Pennsylvania 
and Rhode Island as temporary major generals to sit on the non-statutory 
Military Commission Review Panel111 increase public confidence. 
Despite the determined efforts of some in Congress to shunt ever more 
terrorism cases away from the federal courts and into the military commission 
system,112 the intervening years have remained unkind to the system, leading to 
a search for other confidence-building measures.  A recent one is the 
appointment of yet another chief prosecutor, this time a general officer with 
exceptional legal and military qualifications, promising a new and brighter era 
for the military commissions.113  But a chief prosecutor—however widely 
admired—cannot salvage a system in which the public still lacks confidence, 
especially because the real power in the military commissions is wielded not 
by the prosecutor but by the convening authority, who alone decides who shall 
be prosecuted for what, and who creates the commission, names its members, 
enters into plea agreements, and approves the proceedings.114  (This is not to 
say, however, that the selection of a charismatic chief prosecutor cannot make 
a difference; the examples of Robert H. Jackson at Nuremberg115 and, more 
recently, Louise Arbour116 and Luis Moreno-Ocampo,117 teach that it can.) 
 
 109. Fidell, Military Commissions & Administrative Law, supra note 64, at 381 & n.11. 
 110. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567, 635 (2006), superseded by statute, Military 
Commission Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
 111. Armed Forces Press Serv., Military Commission Review Panel Takes Oath of Office, 
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Sept. 22, 2004), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25238. 
 112. See infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 113. Willy Stern, Rebrander in Chief: The Defense Department’s New Man at Gitmo Hits the 
Reset Button, WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 3, 2001, at 14, 14–16. 
 114. 10 U.S.C. §§ 948i(b), 950b(c) (Supp. IV 2011); MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, 
supra note 61, pt. III, R. 407, 503–04, 601, 705. 
 115. See generally John Q. Barrett, The Nuremberg Roles of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 6 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 511 (2007) (describing J. Robert Jackson’s pivotal role as chief 
prosecutor in the Nuremberg Trials). 
 116. See Marlise Simons, Departing Rights Official Raised Volume on Issues, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 6, 2008, at 13 (describing J. Louise Arbour’s role as chief prosecutor of the United Nations 
tribunals for war crimes in Yugoslavia and Rwanda). 
 117. See generally William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Avtivism at the 
International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 731 (2008) (outlining Luis Moreno-
Ocampo’s powerful position as first lead prosecutor for the International Criminal Court). 
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Another pertinent development is the unveiling of a new Office of Military 
Commissions website following complaints from the media.118  In this digital 
era, a website can be the best known face of an institution, and it is certainly 
commendable that serious attention is finally being paid to this aspect of the 
commission system.  Whether or not the new website’s six-figure price tag119 
is a wise expenditure of taxpayer money remains to be seen, although there are 
reasons to doubt that it is.  For example, it still does not offer prompt, reliable, 
complete access to trial and appellate decisions, and many pleadings submitted 
by the parties are not yet posted, as they routinely are on the Article III courts’ 
PACER system.120  Clicking on documents that are not yet posted produces the 
following notice: 
  The document you are trying to access is currently undergoing a security 
review . . . .  At the completion of the security review, and if the document is 
deemed publically releasable, it will be made available to the public 15 
business days after the document was filed with the court. 
  Please check back often as, once documents become approved for release, 
they will be immediately uploaded to this website.121 
A twenty-three-page motion in United States v. al Nashiri e-filed on October 
19, 2011122 did not appear on the commission’s website until November 2, 
 
 118. Carol Rosenberg, War Court Website Veiled in Secrecy, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 7, 2011, at 
3A. 
 119. The taxpayers spent nearly half a million dollars on the website.  Carol Rosenberg, 
Guantánamo Court Website Cuts Copyright Symbol, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 13, 2011, at 3A 
[hereinafter Rosenberg, Guantánamo Court Website Cuts Copyright Symbol]. 
 120. The court-martial system also does not use PACER, either at trial or on appeal.  See 
Individual Court Pacer Sites, PACER, http://www.pacer.gov/psco/cgi-bin/links.pl (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2012).  The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has improved its own website, 
www.armfor.uscourts.gov, but briefs remain unavailable except for the few cases that the court 
sets down for hearing.  Other briefs are accessible only by visiting the courthouse.  The court has 
by degrees moved to electronic filing, see Order in re Electronic Filing, 69 M.J. 204 (C.A.A.F. 
2010), but it remains far behind the familiar and typically smooth-running process of the Article 
III courts.  The commissions system is even further behind.  When the commission website 
reproduces briefs, signatures, office telephone numbers, and law firm addresses are sometimes 
redacted and sometimes not.  See, e.g., Brief on Behalf of Apellee, United States v. Khadr, No. 
08-003 (U.S.C.M.C.R. Sept. 17, 2008), available at http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/10-
Khadr%20Defense%20Brief%20Requesting%20Court%20Affirm%20Commission%27s%20.pdf 
(not redacting attorney’s information); Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae Office of the Chief 
Defense Counsel, United States v. al Bahlul, No. 09-001 (U.S.C.M.C.R. Oct. 15, 2009), available 
at http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/6-Bahlul%20CDC%20Brief%20(Oct%2015,%2009).pdf 
(redacting (presumably) the attorney’s phone number). 
 121. Military Commissions: Case File, OFF. MIL. COMMISSIONS, http://www.mc.mil/Portals/ 
0/pdfs/FileNotAvailable.pdf (last visisted Mar. 30, 2012). 
 122. Defense Motion to Allow In Camera, Ex Parte Requests for Expert Assistance with 
Limited Notice to the Opposing Party in Compliance with R.M.C. 703, United States v. Al-
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2011.123  Even a government motion to provide greater public access was 
subject to deferred posting.124  The result of the delay in posting motions and 
briefs is that reporters and other observers are still likely to journey to 
Guantánamo with only a vague idea of the issues to be addressed and the 
parties’ positions.  Equally baffling was the Sunday promulgation, without 
notice-and-comment rule making procedures, of the 202-page 2011 edition of 
the Regulation for Trial by Military Commission, on the eve of the trial 
participants’ scheduled departure for Guantánamo for proceedings in the al 
Nashiri case.125 
Curiously, despite the lavish expense, the government contractors who 
designed the new website were so unfamiliar with the basic legal framework 
that they included a transparently illegal126 claim to copyright on behalf of the 
Office of Military Commissions.127 
Other recent ostensible confidence-building measures will allow journalists 
whose employers are unwilling or unable to send them to Guantánamo to 
monitor proceedings from a 100-seat viewing center—price-tag unknown—at 
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.128  Members of the public will be permitted 
to use as many seats as are not filled by reporters.129  Victims’ family members 
will be able to observe the proceedings at a separate facility at the U.S. Naval 
Station in Norfolk, Virginia.130  At the same time, the Pentagon has resisted 
permitting C-SPAN or other broadcast coverage, claiming that would violate 
 
Nashiri, No. AE010 (Oct. 19, 2011), available at http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2011/10/ 
24/15/49/1iE1bb.So.56.pdf. 
 123. See Carol Rosenberg, Military: Court Can’t Free Cole Suspect, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 3, 
2011, at 6A. 
 124. Rosenberg, More Public Viewing of Trial Proposed, supra note 91. 
 125. See REGULATION FOR TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION, supra note 41; Carol 
Rosenberg, Pentagon Publishes War Court Procedures, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 7, 2011), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/11/07/2491574/pentagon-publishes-war-court-
procedures.html. 
 126. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006). 
 127. Rosenberg, Guantánamo Court Website Cuts Copyright Symbol, supra note 119; see E-
mails from Mark H. Gordon, Webmaster, Office of Military Comm’ns, to author (Oct. 12, 2011, 
7:53 AM EDT, Oct. 18, 2011, 8:31 AM) (on file with author); E-mails from author to 
Webmaster, Office of Military Comm’ns, (Oct. 17, 2011, 3:30 PM, Oct. 11, 2011, 5:38 AM, & 
Oct. 11, 2011, 9:52 AM EDT) (on file with author).  For a history of the government works 
doctrine, see David A. Kluft, The Guantanamo Copyright SNAFU and the History of the 
Government Works Doctrine, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=fae35789-429f-40a9-814a-621a79238e7a. 
 128. Rosenberg, More Public Viewing of Trial Proposed, supra note 91. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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federal court rules,131 even though the top court of the military justice system 
has repeatedly permitted televised coverage of its proceedings.132 
Despite the website’s prominent invocation of “Fairness, Transparency, 
[and] Justice,”133 it and the other steps I have noted still seem little more than a 
tardy charm offensive for the military commission system.  “Rebrand[ing],” to 
use a term employed by Willy Stern and Carol Rosenberg,134 the undisputed 
dean of the Guantánamo Bay press corps,135 is unlikely to change the basic 
product line. 
IV.  DOES SIZE MATTER? 
In the Dartmouth College Case,136 Webster famously remarked of his alma 
mater, “It is, Sir, as I have said, a small college.  And yet there are those who 
love it!”137  The military commission system is certainly small, and even its 
staunchest partisans are unlikely to grow as tearily emotional over it as 
Webster did for Dartmouth; but the question is not whether this system should 
be loved, but whether it is such a runt that it cannot reasonably be expected to 
elicit public confidence.  Can a judicial system with the characteristics 
surveyed here be viable?  To what extent are mere caseload numbers a useful 
metric?138 
Small jurisdictions are inherently problematic.  Apart from the danger that 
officials may perform incompatible functions,139 it takes a certain amount of 
through-put to make sure the wheels of justice turn more or less smoothly.  
 
 131. Id. 
 132. See EUGENE R. FIDELL, GUIDE TO THE RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE FOR THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES 264 (13th ed. 2010), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/60447836/CAAF13RulesGuide (collecting cases allowing cameras in 
the courtroom for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces). 
 133. See OFF. MIL. COMMISSIONS, http://www.mc.mil/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). 
 134.  Rosenberg, Guantánamo Court Website Cuts Copyright Symbol, supra note 119; Stern, 
supra note 113, at 14. 
 135. Ms. Rosenberg was honored with the Robert F. Kennedy Journalism Award in 2011 for 
her coverage of Guantánamo Bay over nine years.  Julie Brown, Herald Reporter Wins Top 
Award, MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 23, 2011), http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/04/23/2181935/ 
herald-reporter-carol-rosenberg.html. 
 136. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
 137. See 3 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: LEGAL PAPERS 154 (Andrew J. King ed., 
1989); Maurice G. Baxter, Daniel Webster: The Lawyer, in DANIEL WEBSTER: “THE 
COMPLETEST MAN” 138, 145, 168–69 (Kenneth E. Shewmaker ed., 1990). 
 138. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 101, at 264–65 (considering the International Court of 
Justice by using, among other metrics, usage, measured through the number of filings and 
decisions), 271–72 (examing the caseload of the  International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea), 
281–82 & fig. 182 (comparing regional and international court caseloads). 
 139. See, e.g., McGonnell v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 289, 300–01 (2000) 
(highlighting the multiple roles of the Bailiff of Guernsey). 
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Court systems that are rarely used may not inspire confidence,140 especially if 
other attributes that contribute to confidence are lacking.  Judges and counsel 
may have a tenuous grip on how the pieces are intended to fit together, as 
Professor Ahmad’s account suggests.141  Or the limited bench and prosecution 
and defense bars may be too chummy or incestuous.  Observers may not know 
what to expect.142  Research into governing sources may be difficult or 
impossible,143 as I was reminded when, recalling a murder in the Vatican’s 
 
 140. One such was the U.S. Court for Berlin.  See, e.g., United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 
237 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979) (Stern, J.) (noting that Tiede’s case was the first time in the court’s 24-
year history for the court to convene).  The Department of State dismissed Judge Stern when he 
entertained an environmental case it thought was beyond his charter.  See generally HERBERT J. 
STERN, JUDGMENT IN BERLIN 340–41, 373–74 (1984).  For other U.S. micro court systems, see 
Wake Island Code, 32 C.F.R. pt. 935 (2011); Midway Islands Code, 32 C.F.R. pt. 762 (repealed 
2001).  For a recent Privy Council case that deserves a prize for the obscurity of the jurisdiction 
from which it arose, see Christian v. The Queen [2006] UKPC 47, [2007] 2 A.C. 400 (appeal 
taken from Pitcairn Is.).  There, Lord Hope of Craighead, concurring, commented on the 
unavailability of English statutes or legal texts on Pitcairn.  Id. at [68].  See generally Sue Farran, 
The Case of Pitcairn: A Small Island, Many Questions, 11 J.S. PAC. L. 124 (2007) (decrying the 
lack of attention to human rights issues in trials related to sexual offenses on the small Pitcairn 
Island);  Helen Power, Pitcairn Island: Sexual Offending, Cultural Difference and Ignorance of 
the Law, 2007 CRIM. L. REV. 609 (noting a population of only forty-seven persons and 
considering the “ignorance of the law” issue raised by Christian v. The Queen); Anthony 
Trenwith, The Empire Strikes Back: Human Rights and the Pitcairn Proceedings, 7 J.S. PAC. L. 
(2003), http://www.paclii.org/journals/fJSPL/vol07no2/3.shtml (describing Pitcairn law as “an 
untested hybrid of local and United Kingdom law fraught with issues of applicability, 
justiciability, constitutionality and relevance.”).  Lord Woolf found it “reassuring that such care 
has been taken to achieve justice for a small community of limited means.”  Christian, [2006] 
UKPC 47, [32].  The challenges of administering justice in British microjurisdictions is 
somewhat alleviated by the availability of Privy Council review, see, e.g., Attorney Gen. for the 
Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri & Dhekelia v. Steinhoff, [2005] UKPC 30, but there is 
naturally a trade-off in the jurisdiction’s autonomy.  Small jurisdictions may simply be unable to 
afford much justice.  For example, Argersinger v. Hamlin announced the right to counsel for 
indigent defendants in misdemeanor cases.  407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).  Justice Powell, concurring in 
the result, drew attention to Wright v. Town of Wood, 407 U.S. 918 (1972), where, in response to 
a request from the Court that a response be filed to a certiorari petition, “a lawyer occasionally 
employed by the town . . . explained that Wood, South Dakota, has a population of 132, that it has 
no sewer or water system, . . . and that the town had decided that contesting this case would be an 
unwise allocation of its limited resources.” Id. at 60–61 (Powell, J., concurring).  Certiorari was 
granted, the judgment vacated, and the case remanded for further consideration in light of 
Argersinger.  Wright, 407 U.S. at 918.  In the end, Wright’s habeas petition was granted.  In re 
Wright, 199 N.W.2d 599, 600 (S.D. 1972). 
 141. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
 142. See, e.g., Rosenberg, Rules at Guantánamo Change Daily, supra note 94. 
 143. See, e.g., Christian, [2006] UKPC 47, [32].  For an effort to compile governing sources 
of small jurisdictions, see Andrew Grossman, Finding the Law: the Micro-States and Small 
Jurisdictions of Europe, GLOBALEX (Feb. 2005), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Micro 
states.htm; see also Viola Heutger, Introduction to FINDING THE LAW: MICRO STATES AND 
SMALL JURISDICTIONS: FREEDOMS AND CHALLENGES OF WORKING IN A SMALL JURISDICTION 5 
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Swiss Guard some years before,144 I asked in vain for the pertinent regulations 
so they might be referred to in a military justice casebook.145  Case outcomes 
may seem capricious where there is no yardstick or body of settled precedent 
against which to measure them.  Small jurisdictions may seek to be exempted 
from generally applicable procedural protections.146  None of this is to say that 
it is impossible for a small jurisdiction’s administration of justice to enjoy 
public confidence, but it is to say that achieving that result may be harder than 
one might think.147 
 
(Viola Heutger & Bastiaan D. van der Velden eds., 2011) (noting there is a single law school in 
the Netherlands Antilles, limited textbooks adapted to local laws, a single legal journal, a small 
bar, and paucity of published judgments).  Access to precedent may also be a challenge in Native 
American tribal courts, whose judgments are selectively available through West’s American 
Tribal Law Reporter and other resources.  For an impressive step towards broader understanding 
of the jurisprudence of the many small tribal court systems in the United States, see generally 
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW (2011).  Definitive accounts of 
customary law are likely to be a challenge in any jurisdiction, but the problems multiply in 
inverse proportion to the size of the jurisdiction. 
 144. See Alessandra Stanley, Despite Vatican, Case of Swiss Guard’s Murder Remains Alive, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1999, at A13. 
 145. I was politely informed that “the disciplinary rules and procedures that govern the Swiss 
Guard are strictly confidential and only for the internal use.”  Letter from Colonel Elmar Th. 
Mäder, Commander, Guardia Svizzera Pontificia, to author, July 1, 2003 (on file with author).  
My effort to obtain the rules governing the Duke of Atholl’s army (the last private army in 
Europe, see generally The Atholl Gathering, BLAIR CASTLE, http://www.blair-castle.co.uk/ 
events_parade_gathering.cfm (last visited Mar. 12, 2012)) were even less successful.  
Inexplicably, His Grace did not respond to my request. 
 146. The armed force in which I served as a baby lawyer, the U.S. Coast Guard, is much 
smaller than the other U.S. armed forces, and happily does not generate much of a disciplinary 
case load.  At times it has sought relief from various provisions of American military law, 
typically to no avail.  E.g., United States v. Clevidence, 14 M.J. 17, 19 (C.M.A. 1982) 
(suggesting, in a post-trial delay case, that “in view of the relatively small number of cases tried 
by the Coast Guard which require verbatim records, that Service can make arrangements with the 
other uniformed Services for loan of court reporters”); United States v. Moorehead, 20 C.M.A. 
574, 579–80 (1971) (rejecting argument that, as the smallest armed force, the Coast Guard was 
not required to comply with provision of Article 26(c) of the U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 826(c), that 
judging must be the primary duty of general court-martial military judges). 
 147. The disadvantages that flow from a paucity of cases is ironic in one sense: according to 
the U.N. Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 32, ¶ 22, to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug. 23, 2007), “[t]rials of 
civilians by military or special courts should be exceptional, i.e.[,] limited to cases where the 
State party can show that resorting to such trials is necessary and justified by objective and 
serious reasons, and where with regard to the specific class of individuals and offences at issue 
the regular civilian courts are unable to undertake the trials.” (emphasis added).  In other words, it 
is inherently the case that there will be few such trials. 
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CONCLUSION 
As things stand, it is difficult to see an improved basis for public 
confidence in the military commission system.  It remains, after ten full years, 
more of a work in progress than it should be, and that in itself is a bad sign.  In 
my view, even if many—and perhaps most Americans—support the use of 
military commissions over the federal courts as a forum for prosecuting 
persons charged with terrorism148 (a proposition that should have federal 
judges scratching their heads), it’s too late. 
Might it have been otherwise?  Perhaps: had there been less personnel 
turbulence among prosecutors and defense counsel.  Had there been greater 
transparency in the rule-making process under both the Bush and Obama 
Administrations.  Had the details of the legislation enacted in 2006 and 2009 
been subjected to more meaningful congressional hearings.  Had the Pentagon 
been more effective in explaining and justifying the system.  Had the Bush 
Administration been willing to provide greater procedural protections from the 
beginning, rather than having them forced on it through litigation (and the 
threat thereof) and a welter of public opposition.  Finally, had the Obama 
Administration been more proactive and effective in explaining why some 
terrorism cases should be tried in military commissions and some in federal 
district court, and had it been willing to stick to its guns in proposing to 
prosecute the high-value detainees in district court. 
All of these were forks in the road.  Had the roads not taken been taken, 
my conviction is that despite the continuing string of congressional efforts to 
tie President Obama’s hands,149 the military commissions would still be a tall 
 
 148. Data from a 2010 Rasmussen poll indicated that sixty-three percent of American voters 
prefer military commissions over district court trials.  Josh Gerstein, Poll: 63% Favor Military 
Tribunals Over Civilian Trials, POLITICO (Dec. 15, 2010, 2:23 PM), www.politico.com/blogs/ 
joshgerstein/1210/Poll_63_favor_military_tribunals_over_civilian_trials.html.  More recent data 
showed a slight decline to sixty percent.  Poll: Most Favor Keeping Gitmo Open, UPI.COM (Mar. 
14, 2011, 4:41 PM), upi.com/Top_News/2011/03/14/Poll-Most-favor-keeping-Gitmo-open/UPI-
69781300135319. 
 149. Congress has enacted (and President Obama has signed) legislation preventing closure of 
Guantánamo and severely impeding his ability both to bring detainees to the mainland for civilian 
trial and to repatriate detainees.  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 
H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. §§ 1031–42 (2011) (enacted).  A remarkable proposed amendment to the 
2012 defense authorization bill would have gone even further to require that all suspected 
terrorists be brought to Guantánamo and tried by military commission.  Jeh C. Johnson, Gen. 
Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Speech to the Heritage Foundation, Wash., D.C., at 8 (Oct. 18, 2011), 
available at http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2011/10/18/16/22/1l9Nv5.So.56.pdf.   The 
Obama Administration has made it clear that it objects to these provisions.  See id. at 7–9.  The 
noxious “Ayotte amendment” failed in the Senate.  Robert Pear, Senate, at Least for a Day, Gets 
Back to Legislating, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2011, at A10 (referring to amendment proposed by 
Sen. Kelly Ayotte); see also Editorial, Peddling Fear: Just When the United States Was 
Repairing its Reputation, the Senate Tries to Shred it Again, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2011, at SR10 
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order, and not only because of their checkered history.150  The fatal flaw is that 
they remain an exceptional jurisdiction that lacks the deep roots, solid 
foundations, and, for lack of a better term, normalcy that Americans should 
demand of institutions that are responsible, even in a small way, for the 
administration of justice. 
One thing that might suggest a different outcome would have been a real 
sense that the country was at war.  Because, however, of the manner in which 
the post-9/11 military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have been conducted, 
eschewing conscription and demanding little beyond the timely payment of 
normal taxes of most Americans, the only people who have actually felt the 
country to be on a war footing are our fighting men and women and their 
immediate and extended families.  For the rest of us, it has been business as 
usual.151  A population that has this experience is unlikely to embrace 
unfamiliar institutions from long ago that smack of war, or, more to the point, 
to give those measures the modest presumption of validity that may be 
necessary in order to earn and maintain public confidence.  By invoking a 
controversial wartime measure while taking pains to avoid wartime conditions, 
therefore, the Bush Administration’s resort to a military commission system 
was a doomed effort to have its cake and eat it too. 
The body of scholarship that has grown up around the revived military 
commissions is impressive.  Because so little has actually occurred in the trial 
and appellate courtrooms of the current system and because the lion’s share of 
media outlets have not made sustained commitments to covering the 
proceedings in Guantánamo, the situation on the ground has largely been 
ignored, with attention understandably focusing instead on matters of theory, 
politics, and litigation conducted on the mainland.  Without denigrating that 
body of work, the fact that the high-value detainees will be tried by military 
 
(referring to Ayotte amendment and another proposed by Sen. Carl Levin); Charlie Savage, 
G.O.P. Takes Hard Line in Pushing Military Trials for All Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 
2011, at A4.  Legislation compelling the use of military commissions perversely stands on its 
head the Human Rights Committee’s observation that special courts should be the exception 
rather than the rule.  See supra note 147.  The concept of complementarity—that the International 
Criminal Court may be resorted to only when a nation is unwilling or unable to prosecute in its 
own courts—provides a useful analogy that militates against the use of military commissions for 
offenses that are within the jurisdiction of the district courts.  See Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
 150. See Eugene R. Fidell, The Trouble with Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2009, at WK8. 
 151. “At home, wartime had become a policy, rather than a state of existence.” MARY L. 
DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES 135 (2012).  “We are 
routinely asked to support our troops, but otherwise war requires no sacrifice of most Americans, 
and as conflict goes on, Americans pay increasingly less attention to it.” Id. at 8; cf. William 
Deresiewicz, An Empty Regard, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, at SR1 (“Now, instead of sharing the 
burden, we sentimentalize it.  It’s a lot easier to idealize the people who are fighting than it is to 
send your kid to join them.  This is also a form of service, I suppose: lip service.”). 
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commissions after all suggests that the commission system will be with us for 
the foreseeable future. 
An examination of the system as it actually exists under the Military 
Commissions Act of 2009 suggests that despite recent efforts at rebranding, 
and even if its basic framework otherwise passed muster, the system has been, 
is, and will remain too small to be viable in light of the criteria for evaluating 
any system of justice in a democratic society.  What legislators and federal 
judges will make of this can only be a matter of speculation.  The 
congressional persistence in seeking to channel terrorism-related cases to the 
military forum suggests that this basic proposition will have no effect.152  Still, 
it is an important perspective that should be borne in mind, not only by 
legislators but also by the executive branch so that future inter-branch 
consultations on the punishment of terrorists can be more fully informed and a 
greater measure of confidence achieved in the overall administration of justice 
in such cases.  Until such time as the country comes to be on a war footing in 
fact rather than just as a matter of political rhetoric,153 the commissions should 




 152. See supra note 149.  Although this perspective may change as budgetary pressures 
increase, questions of fiscal austerity seem to play little role when it comes to military legal 
matters.  If Congress were serious about cutting the military budget, there would not be three 
separate military law schools.  Nor would there be four separate intermediate military appellate 
courts.  Fidell, Military Law, supra note 95, at 170. 
 153. See DUDZIAK, supra note 151, at 124, 127. 
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